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Abstrat This artile is an overview of results obtained in the eld of dy-
nami network games with pairwise interation. The paper provides a sum-
mary and analysis of works related to two-stage and multistage nonzero-sum
games based on pairwise interation. The meaning of pairwise interation is
to onsider the game as a family of games ourring on a network between
pairs of players (verties of a graph) onneted to eah other by an edge.
The network an be set or formed in the rst stage. In the paper, solutions
of ooperative pairwise interation games are also onsidered.
Keywords: ooperative games, network games, dynami games, the Shapley
value, pairwise interations, time-onsisteny.
1. Introdution
Cooperative network games is an important part of modern game theory. Net-
works illustrate onnetions between players and their ability to ommuniate in
oalitions. For the rst time in the game theory literature, a non-ooperative form
of pairwise interation in a network was onsidered in (Dyer and Mohanaraj, 2011)
meaning diret interations between network neighbors. But ooperative approah
is quite natural and moreover beneial for players as it provides them with a
better outome rather than nonooperative behavior. First ooperative interpre-
tation of pairwise interation games was in (Bulgakova and Petrosyan, 2015). So-
lutions of network games with pairwise interations were examined in detail in
(Bulgakova, 2019).
Also of interest are solutions for games with pairwise interation on spei net-
works. The geometri struture of the network and symmetry make it possible to
simplify some omplex formulas and get their simple expliit form
(Petrosyan, Sedakov and Bulgakova, 2018; Bulgakova and Petrosyan, 2019a).
When ooperative behavior is investigated, it is important that players follow
a ooperative agreement during the whole ourse of the game. If a solution of the
ooperative game is time onsistent, players have no reason to deviate from the
aepted agreement. Conditions for strongly time-onsistene of ore in 3-person
games with pairwise interations was studied in (Bulgakova and Petrosyan, 2016).
Also, time onsistent ooperative solutions for multistage games with speial payos
wad onsidered in (Kuzyutin and Nikitina, 2017).
Sometimes it is diult to determine the expliit form of the ore and deide on
its stability, in this ase, subsets of the ore are used, whih an be found in various
ways. For example, as in (Petrosyan and Pankratova, 2018). Also, a speial subset of
⋆
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the ore, the IDP-ore, was onsidered in (Petrosian, Gromova and Pogozhev, 2018;
Wolf, Zakharov and Petrosian, 2017). The adaptation of the IDP-ore to games
with pairwise interation was arried out in (Bulgakova and Petrosyan, 2019b).
In this paper, we analyse and ompare the results in the eld of ooperative
network games with pairwise interation.
2. Two-Stage Network Games with Pairwise Interations
Consider a model of two stage ooperative network games with pairwise inter-
ations (Dyer and Mohanaraj, 2011), when network is not given. So, players should
form a network on the rst stage. These game was studied in (Bulgakova and Pet-
rosyan, 2015). Let us explain the model.
Let N be a nite set of players, whih an make deisions in two stages, |N | =
n ≥ 2. Denote as z stage of game. The game started in stage z1, where every player
i ∈ N hoose his behavior b1i = (b1i1, . . . , b1in)  n-dimensional vetor with oers for
onnetions to other players (Petrosyan, Sedakov and Bohkarev, 2013).
We will use following notations: Mi ⊆ N \ {i}  those players, whom player
i ∈ N an oer a onnetion, wherein ai ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} is maximal number of
onnetions for player i, whih he an maintain simultaneously. If Mi = N \ {i},
it means, that player i an oer onnetions for all players. In ase, if ai = n − 1,
player i an maintain any number of onnetions.




1, if j ∈ Qi,
0, other,
(1)
with additional ondition ∑
j∈N
b1ij ≤ ai. (2)
Condition (2) means, that number of possible onnetions is restrited for every
player. Also, obviously, |Qi| ≤ ai.
Connetion ij is formed if and only if, b1ij = b
1
ji = 1. Formed onnetions ij
reate edges of network g, where vertex are players, i.e., if b1ij = b
1
ji = 1, then there
is an edge between i and j in network g.
Denote by Ni(g) or simply Ni neighbours of player i in network g, i.e. Ni(g) =
{j ∈ N \ {i} : ij ∈ g}. As result of the rst stage we have network g(b11, . . . , b1n).
After network is formed players move to stage z2(g), whih depend on network. On
seond stage z2(g), neighbours on network play pairwise in simultaneous bimatrix
games, after that players get their payos and the game ends. In other words, we
have two stage game Γz1(g), whih is speial ase of multistage nonzero-sum games.
In onsidered ase strategy of player is a rule, whih for every player determine his
set of neighbours on the rst stage, namely vetor b1i , and his behavior in every
bimatrix game on seond stage orresponding to network, whih is formed on the




i ), i ∈ N , strategy of player i in two-stage
game Γz1(g). Calulate payo of player i as hi(z2), where (z1, z2) is a path, realized
by strategy prole u = (u1(·), . . . , un(·)) in game Γz1(g). Beause on the rst stage
players do not get their payos, payo funtion in game Γz1(g) with starting position
z1 is determined by following expression:
Ki(z1;u) = Ki(z1;ui(·), . . . , un(·)) = hi(z2).
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2.1. Charateristi Funtion
On seond stage game represents a set of pairwise simultaneous bimatrix games
{γij} between neighbours in network. Namely, let i ∈ N, j ∈ Ni. Then player i (the
rst player) play with player j (the seond player)in bimatrix game γij with payo
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m2 · · · cijmk

 (4)
apl ≥ 0, cpl ≥ 0, p = 1, . . . ,m, l = 1, . . . , k.
Constants m and k oinide for all i and j. When we have game γji, i.e. player
i is the seond player, he has payo matrix Cji = A
T
ij , and player j has matrix
Aji = C
T
ij . Denote by Γ
S
z2(g) subgame of game Γ , whih takes plae on seond stage
z2. Consider this game in ooperative form. Find harateristi funtion for every
subset (oalition) S ⊂ N as lower (maxmin) value for two person zero-sum game
of oalition S and oalition N \ S, based on game ΓSz2(g). Payo of oalition S is
sum payos of players from oalition S. Super-additivity of harateristi funtion










cjipℓ, p = 1, . . . ,m; ℓ = 1, . . . , k. (6)
and v(z2;S), S ⊂ N , is lower value of zero-sum game ΓSz2(g).
Theorem 1 (Bulgakova, 2019). Funtion v(z2;S) is determined by following
expressions:
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Consider a ooperative form of two-stage game Γz1(g). Suppose, that players
hose strategies ūi, i ∈ N , that maximize their total payo in game Γz1(g), i. e.
∑
i∈N




Ki(z1;u1, . . . , un).
Strategy prole ū = (ū1, . . . , ūn) we will all ooperative behavior, and orrespond-
ing path (z̄1, z̄2)  ooperative path.
As previously, for oalition S ⊆ N dene harateristi funtion v(z̄1;S) as
maxmin value in two person zero-sum game between oalition S (maximizing player)
and oalition N \ S (minimizing player). For minimazing player the best way of
behavor is to not reate all the onnetions with maximizing player (beause of
positive payos for eah onnetion). Payo of oalition S is sum of payos of its
members.
Denote by v(z1;S), S ⊂ N , lower value of zero-sum game Γz1(g).
Theorem 2. Funtion v(z1;S) is dened in following way:












pℓ), S ⊂ N, (12)













Denition 1. Charateristi funtion is alled supermodular and orresponding
game alled onvex (Shapley, 1971), if for any oalition X ⊂ N and Y ⊂ N holds
inequality:
v(X ∪ Y ) ≥ v(X) + v(Y )− v(X ∩ Y ). (14)
Theorem 3 (Bulgakova, 2019). In subgame ΓSz2(g) harateristi funtion (8)-
(10) is supermodular.
This property guarantees non-emptiness of the ore and that the Shapley value
belongs to the ore.
2.3. Star-Network
Consider a spei struture of network, and solution of ooperative game on
this network. We will study network, whih ontains n players, where player 1 is
entral player with n− 1 onnetions, and all other n− 1 players are onneted by
edge only with a entral player.
The Shapley Value. Denote the set of imputations by
M[v(z̄t)] = {x = (x1, . . . , xn) :
n∑
i=1
xi = v(z̄t;N), xi ≥ v(z̄t; {i}), i ∈ N}.
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Consider as a solution of star-network the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) and






(|S| − 1)!(n− |S|)!
n!
[v(z̄t;S)− v(z̄t;S \ {i})]. (15)
We say that the ooperative solution M[v(z̄1)] in the two-stage game is time
onsistent if for any imputation ξ[v(z̄1)] ∈ M[v(z̄1)] there exists an imputation
ξ[v(z̄2)] ∈ M[v(z̄2)] suh that
ξ[v(z̄1)] = ξ[v(z̄2)], (16)
Thus the Shapley value ϕ[v(z̄1)] is a time onsistent ooperative solution if
ϕ[v(z̄1)] = ϕ[v(z̄2)], (17)
otherwise the Shapley value is time inonsistent.
One has to mention that the ooperative version of the game has been devel-
oped for a general ase of pairwise interations when any (feasible) network an be
formed at the rst stage of the game. For this general ase, we have found analytial
expressions for the harateristi funtions (8), (11) whih are used to alulate the
Shapley value by (15) and verify the orresponding time onsisteny ondition 17.
Sine the alulation of the Shapley value is a hallenging task for a large number
of players and an arbitrary network, in the following we will show how to simplify
formula 15 for a network of a speial type  a star. This type of the network will
provide us with an analytial expression for the Shapley value whih is muh easier
to interpret and analyze. Nevertheless, expressions (8), (11), (15) an help us to
nd the Shapley value for any network at least numerially. From (15) we note that
to ompute a omponent of the Shapley value, we need to list all 2n subsets of
the player set N ; moreover for large networks we may be limited in omputational
apabilities to alulate n! as this number an be extremely large. In ontrast, for a
star network we will need only O(n) alulations and will not need to list all subsets
of N .
Beause the Shapley value belongs to the ore in subgame ΓSz2(g), then its sig-
niane in this lass of problems inreases.
Now formalize onstrution of star-network on the rst stage of game. Suppose
following, letM1 = N \{1}, a1 = n−1 andMi = {1}, ai = 1 for i 6= 1. To maximize
total payo, players should hose on the rst stage following behaviors:
b1i =
{
(0, 1, . . . , 1), i = 1,
(1, 0, . . . , 0), i 6= 1. (18)
Behavior (18) formed a star network on the rst stage with entral player 1, (g.
1), where |N1| = n − 1 and |Ni| = 1, i 6= 1. For star-network alulate the har-
ateristi funtion in view of spei struture of network. Transform expressions
(8-10) orresponding to a star-network:




w11j , i = 1,
wi1i, i 6= 1.
(20)






































w11k, S ⊂ N, i ∈ S,
0, i /∈ S.
(21)
Similarly, we transform the expressions (11)-(13)








pℓ), S ⊂ N, i ∈ S,
0, i /∈ S.
(23)
The network has entral symmetry and formula (15) an be simplied.
Proposition 1 (Petrosyan, Sedakov and Bulgakova, 2018). For star-network












(m1j − v(z̄t; {j}))





v(z̄t; {i}) +m1i − w11i
]








p = 1, . . . ,m
ℓ = 1, . . . , k
(aijpℓ + b
ij
pℓ), if i and j are neighbors,
0, otherwise.
(25)
Time-Consisteny of the Shapley Value in a Star-Network Consider time-
onsisteny of Shapley value in a star-network. Remind that the Shapley value
ϕ[v(z̄1)] is time-onsistent ooperative solution, if
ϕ[v(z̄1)] = ϕ[v(z̄2)]. (26)
Proposition 2 (Petrosyan, Sedakov and Bulgakova, 2018). For star-network
with entral player 1, the Shapley value is time-onsistent, when w1i1 = w
i1
i for any
player i 6= 1.
Conditions for time-onsisteny w1i1 = w
i1
i , i 6= 1, from (2) for star-network an
be interpreted in following way: entral player 1 and any other player i 6= 1 should
have similar minimal guaranteed payo (maxmin value) in bimatrix game γ1i whih
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they play as neighbours. If at least for one player j w1j1 6= wj1j , then the Shapley
value will be time-inonsistent. However, in the latter ase, a ooperative agreement
may be reahed at the expense of IDP  imputation distribution proedure. Re-
mind the denition:
Denition 2. Funtion βi, i ∈ N alled imputation distribution proedure (IDP)





i , i ∈ N. (27)
Proposition 3. For star-network with entral player 1, time-onsistent IDP β =






























w11i +m1i − wii1
]




wii1 +m1i − w11i
]
, i 6= 1.
(29)
From an eonomi perspetive, it is preferable for players to have a nonnegative
IDP, suh that deomposing the Shapley value over two game stages, eah player
reeives her nonnegative payments at either of the two game stages. However the
IDP of the Shapley value mentioned in the latter proposition an be nonnegative
only in ase when w1i1 = w
i1
i for eah i 6= 1. This equality results in the time
onsisteny of the Shapley value whih has already been disussed.
Three examples below demonstrate that the Shapley value being an imputation
in a ooperative two-stage game with pairwise interations an be both time onsis-
tent and time inonsistent despite players' asymmetry in their neighbors. The rst
example show the time onsisteny of the Shapley value in an important lass of
bimatrix games.
Prisoner's Dilemma Consider the ase, when n players play the same bimatrix
game γ with their neighbors, i.e., Aij = A, Cij = C for all i ∈ N , j ∈ Ni where





, 0 < a < b.
Here b is the payo to eah onneted player if they both ooperate, while if
the both defet eah of them gets a. As an example, one an onsider a data
transmission problem in a network whose nodes have to oordinate their ations
trying to ahieve ertain performane (for example, the number of pakets sent, a
prot from sending pakets).
For the given game using (5), (6), (25) we obtain: wiji = w
ij
j = a and
mij =
{
2b, if i and j are neighbors,
0, otherwise,
(30)
102 Mariia A. Bulgakova
for any two players i, j ∈ N .
To nd the Shapley value ϕ[v(z̄2)], we rst determine harateristi funtion





2b(n− 1), S = N,
2b(|S| − 1) + (n− |S|)a, S ⊂ N, 1 ∈ S,
|S|a, S ⊂ N, 1 /∈ S,
0, S = ∅.
(31)








[a+ 2b− a)] = b, i 6= 1.
Similarly, to nd the Shapley value ϕ[v(z̄1)], we determine harateristi funtion





2b(n− 1), S = N,
2b(|S| − 1), S ⊂ N, 1 ∈ S,
0, S ⊂ N, 1 /∈ S or S = ∅.
(32)









= b, i 6= 1.
Comparing ϕ[v(z̄1)] and ϕ[v(z̄2)], we note that they oinide and hene the Shapley
value is time onsistent. What is interesting, this result does not depend upon
spei values of a and b. The only restrition whih has to be imposed is 0 < a < b,
and it is natural for this lass of games.
The time onsisteny of the Shapley value an also be shown with the use of
Proposition 2 instead of applying diret alulations. Indeed, we see that wi1i =
w1i1 = a for eah i 6= 1 what implies its time onsisteny.
Example In the next example we demonstrate the time inonsisteny of the Shap-
ley value. Consider a 4-person game with N = {1, 2, 3, 4} in whih players form a
star network under a ooperative agreement (see Fig. 2). Let simultaneous bimatrix
games γ12, γ13 and γ14 be dened by means of the following payo matries:
(A12, C12) =
(2, 2) (3, 0)
(5, 1) (1, 2)
, (A13, C13) =
(3, 1) (4, 2)
(6, 2) (2, 3)
,
(A14, C14) =
(1, 3) (3, 2)
(6, 6) (4, 1)
.
To ompute the Shapley values ϕ[v(z̄1)] and ϕ[v(z̄2)], we use the orresponding
formulas (9), (11) for harateristi funtions v(z̄2; ·) and v(z̄1; ·), respetively, and
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Fig. 2. A star with four players
the simplied formula (24). Hene we get:
w112 = 2, w
1
13 = 3, w
1
14 = 4,
w221 = 1, w
3
31 = 2, w
4
41 = 3,
m12 = 6, m13 = 8, m14 = 12,
(33)
and therefore
v(z̄1; {1}) = 0, v(z̄2; {1}) = 9,
v(z̄1; {2}) = 0, v(z̄2; {2}) = 1,
v(z̄1; {3}) = 0, v(z̄2; {3}) = 2,
v(z̄1; {4}) = 0, v(z̄2; {4}) = 3,
v(z̄1;N) = 26, v(z̄2;N) = 26.
(34)
Thus the Shapley values are given by
ϕ[v(z̄1)] = (13, 3, 4, 6),
ϕ[v(z̄2)] = (29/2, 5/2, 7/2, 11/2).
We observe that the Shapley value ϕ[v(z̄1)] in the two-stage game diers from the
Shapley value ϕ[v(z̄2)] in the one-stage game starting at the seond stage. This
means time inonsisteny of the Shapley value. Sine ϕ2[v(z̄2)] = 5/2 < ϕ2[v(z̄1)] =
3, player 2 an break the ooperative agreement as she an get less (here we reall
that players do not reeive payos at the network formation stage). Similarly, it is
also true for player 3: ϕ3[v(z̄2)] = 7/2 < ϕ3[v(z̄1)] = 4 and player 4: ϕ4[v(z̄2)] =
11/2 < ϕ4[v(z̄1)] = 6. However introduing a time-onsistent IDP of the Shapley
value ϕ[v(z̄1)] over two stages determined with the use of Proposition 3 for the star
network, we obtain
β11 = −3/2, β12 = 1/2, β13 = 1/2, β14 = 1/2,
β21 = 29/2, β
2
2 = 5/2, β
2
3 = 7/2, β
2
4 = 11/2,
and therefore implementing it, the ooperation of players will be sustainable. Thus
reeiving β1i at the rst stage and β
2
i at the seond stage, player i ∈ N will get
ϕi[v(z̄1)] in two stages whih is exatly her ooperative payo presribed by the
Shapley value ϕ[v(z̄1)].
2.4. The Core in Two-Stage Three-Person Game
Consider three-person-game with pairwise interations on any network and take
as solution the ore. Find onditions for strongly time-onsisteny (Petrosyan, 1995)
of ore in this game.
Dene the ore C(z̄) ⊂ Mv in game Γ and suppose, that for every z1, z2,
C(z̄) 6= ∅.
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xi ≥ v(z̄1;S) (35)
for all S ⊂ N , and
N∑
i=1
xi = v(z̄1;N). (36)
For subgame Γz2 we have following values of harateristi funtion:
v(z̄2; ∅) = 0, v(z̄2; {1}) = w113 + w112, v(z̄2; {2}) = w212 + w223, v(z̄2; {3}) = w313 + w323,












































x1 + x2 ≥ v(z̄2; {12}),
x1 + x3 ≥ v(z̄2; {13}),
x2 + x3 ≥ v(z̄2; {23}),
x1 ≥ v(z̄2; {1}),
x2 ≥ v(z̄2; {2}),
x3 ≥ v(z̄2; {3}),
x1 + x2 + x3 = v(z̄2;N).
(37)































x1 + x2 + x3 = v(z̄2;N).
(38)




























Then system of inequalities (38), whih denes the struture of the ore C(z̄2)




x1 + x2 ≥ E12 +D1,
x1 + x3 ≥ E13 +D2,
x2 + x3 ≥ E23 +D3,
x1 + x2 + x3 = v(z̄2;N).
(39)
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Denition 4. The ore C(z1) is strongly time-onsistent in game Γ
(Petrosyan, 1995), if
1. C(z̄1) 6= ∅, C(z̄2) 6= ∅
2. For every imputation x ∈ C(z1) there exists suh IDP β = (β1, β2), that x =
β1 + β2 and
C(z̄1) ⊃ β1 ⊕ C(z̄2).
Here symbol ⊕ denes as a ∈ Rn, B ⊂ Rn, then a⊕B = {a+ b : b ∈ B}.
































2 ≥ E12 +D1,
β12 + β
3
2 ≥ E13 +D2,
β22 + β
3
2 ≥ E23 +D3.
(44)
Fix β1, then for strongly time-onsisteny we should full onditions (44) for β2.











2 from onditions (44), then




−β31 + E12 +D1 ≥ E12,
−β21 + E13 +D2 ≥ E13,
−β11 + E23 +D3 ≥ E23.
(45)
Thus, we have onditions for strongly time-onsisteny of the ore C(z̄1) in game
Γ .
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Theorem 4 (Bulgakova and Petrosyan, 2016). Suppose, that following inequal-







(i.e there exists β1 whih satised (4)), then the ore C(z̄1) is strongly time-onsistent.
3. Multistage Games with Pairwise Interations
In (Bulgakova and Petrosyan, 2019a), the results obtained for the two-stage
games are generalized to the ase of multistage games.
Let abstrat spae Z is given and alled spae of states. In every state z ∈ Z
n-person nonzero-sum game Γ (z) is determined. This is network game with net-
work g(z), where players are vertexes and edges are onnetions (as in two-stage
ase). Game Γ (z) is a set of simultaneous pairwise bimatrix games {γij(z)} between
neighbours by network, i ∈ N, j ∈ N, i 6= j.
Let i ∈ N, j ∈ N, i 6= j. Then i plays with j in bimatrix game γij(z) with payo
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m2(z) · · · cijmr(z)

 (48)
aijpq(z) ≥ 0, cijpq(z) ≥ 0, p = 1, . . . ,m, q = 1, . . . , r, i, j ∈ N.
Constants m and k oinide for all i and j. When we have game γji(z), i.e.
player i is the seond player, he has payo matrix Cji(z) = A
T
ij(z), and player j has
matrix Aji(z) = C
T
ij(z). To simplify the following expressions we suppose, that m
and r oinide for all i and j and all z.
Consider the strategy of player i in game Γ (z). It is a vetor
ui(z) = (u
1
i (z), . . . , u
j
i (z), . . . u
n
i (z)), where u
j
i is strategy of player i in bimatrix
game γij(z). So, we have, that strategy of player i is a vetor onsisting from rows
(pure strategies), hosen by him in bimatrix games γij(z). Denote by
u(z) = (u1(z), . . . , un(z)) strategy prole in game Γ (z). Strategy of player j is
a vetor onsisting from olumns in orresponding bimatrix games γij(z). Dene









Consider game Γ (z) in ooperative form. As in two-stage ase, introdue hara-
teristi funtion v(S; z), S ⊂ N as lower (maxmin) value in two-person zero-sum
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cijpq(z), p = 1, . . . ,m; q = 1, . . . , r.
Lemma 1. Charateristi funtion v(S; z) is dened in the following way





















ωiij(z), S ⊂ N, (51)












Suppose, that in state z ∈ Z in game Γ (z) players hoose the strategy prole:
ui(z) = (u
1
i (z), . . . , u
n
i (z)). Then the game moves to the state z
′
, where game Γ (z′)
takes plae, with simultaneous bimatrix games with matries, depended from strate-
gies hosen on previous state z. Thus the state z′ depends on state z and strategies
in this state. We an introdue funtion T : Z×∏ni=1 Ui → Z by formula:
z′ = T (z;u1(z), u2(z), . . . , un(z)).
Multistage game G(z) develops in following way. Game G(z1) starts in state z1. In
state z1 game Γ (z1) is take plae, players hoose their strategies u1(z1), u2(z1), . . . ,
un(z1), then they pass to the state z2 = T (z1;u1(z1), u2(z1), . . . , un(z1)). In state
zk players play game Γ (zk), hoose strategies u1(zk), u2(zk), . . . , un(zk) and pass to
the state zk+1 = T (zk;u1(zk), u2(zk), . . . , un(zk)). Game ends on stage ℓ in state
zℓ. Then, after hoosing strategies on every stage of game path z1, z2, . . . , zk, . . . , zℓ
is realized. Strategy in this multistage game u(·) = u{(z)}, is a set of players'
strategies, dened in every state z ∈ Z. It follows from above, that any strategy
prole u(·) = {u1(·), . . . , un(·)} denes only one path, and, therefore a payo for











Note, that set of all paths in multistage game G(z) is nite. Hene, the set of states
is also nite. Denote this set by Z ⊂ Z Consider speial ase, when v(N ; z) is the
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Dene also harateristi funtion V (S; zk) for multistage game G(zk), whih starts
in state zk. Funtion V (S; zk) an be alulated using the following analogue of
Bellman equation:


















i (u1, . . . un) + V (S;T (zk−1;u(zk−1)))
)
];
V (S; zℓ) = v(S; zℓ).
Dene
W (S; zk) = (l − k + 1)w(S)
where ℓ is number of stages in game G(z1).
The following inequality takes plae (see Petrosyan and Pankratova, 2018):
W (S, zk) ≥ V (S, zk), S ⊂ N.
Remind that one-stage game Γ (z) is onvex and harateristi funtion v(S; z),
S ⊂ N is supermodular. So, we have:
v(X ∪ Y ; z) ≥ v(X ; z) + v(Y ; z)− v(X ∩ Y ; z).
Take the maximum by z ∈ Z in the left and right sides of the inequality
max
z
v(X ∪ Y ; z) ≥ max
z




v(X ∩ Y ; z).
Sine maxz v(S; z) = w(S), we have:
w(X ∪ Y ) ≥ w(X) + w(Y )− w(X ∩ Y ).
The funtion w(S) is supermodular.
Lemma 2. Funtion w(S) in game Γ (z) is supermodular.
3.1. Optimality Priniple
Dene the set of all imputations MW in game G(z1) as
MW = {x = (x1, . . . , xn) :
n∑
i=1
xi =W (N ; z1), xi ≥W ({i}; z1), i ∈ N}.
And by optimality priniple any subset of this set MW .
Choose in one-stage game Γ (z) as optimality priniple an analogue of the ore
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In similar way dene set Ĉ(W (S; z)) in multistage game G(z) as set of imputa-
tions, whih satisfy following onditions:
∑
i∈S
xi ≥W (S; z), S ⊂ N, (52)
N∑
i=1
xi =W (N ; z). (53)
Theorem 5. For any x ∈ Ĉ(W (S; zk)), x = (x1, . . . , xn) and any k = 1, l, the
following equality holds:
xi = (ℓ − k + 1)x′i, where x′i ∈ Ĉ(w(S)), i = 1, n.
3.2. Strongly Time-Consisteny
Suppose, that players hose strategies ū(·) = (ū1(·), . . . , ūn(·)), whih maximize
the total payo in G(z1):
∑
i∈N




Ki(z1;u1, . . . , un).
The path (z̄1, z̄2, . . . , z̄ℓ), orresponding to this strategies is alled ooperative path
(z1 = z̄1). Rewrite denition of IDP (2) for the game under onsideration.
Denition 5. Vetor βi, i ∈ N is alled imputation distribution proedure (IDP)




βik, i ∈ N. (54)
Denition 6. Optimality priniple Ĉ(W (S; z̄1)) is strongly time-onsistent in game
G(z̄1) (see Petrosyan, 1995), if
1. Ĉ(W (S; z̄k)) 6= ∅, k = 1, ℓ




βj ⊕ Ĉ(W (S; z̄k+1)) ⊂ Ĉ(W (S; z̄1)), k = 1, ℓ− 1.
Here symbol ⊕ means, that if a ∈ Rn, B ⊂ Rn, then a⊕B = {a+ b : b ∈ B}.
Proposition 4. Optimality priniple Ĉ(W (S; z̄1)), k = 1, ℓ in game G(z̄1) is
strongly time-onsistent.
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3.3. General Case
Now onsider general ase, when values of v(N ; z) do not oinide for dierent
z. Introdue funtion L(z̄k) is joint payo of maximal oalition N in state z̄k ∈ z̄,








Suppose, that w(S) < minz̄k L(z̄k), S 6= N . And onsider funtion w(S; z̄k),
w(S; z̄k) = w(S), w(N, z̄k) = L(z̄k). Let x be any imputation in game G(z̄1).
Consider as optimality priniple an analogue of the ore in game G(z̄k) alled
Ĉ(W (S; z̄k)); the following set
∑
i∈S






L(z̄k) = Ŵ (N ; z̄k). (57)
Suppose, that all Ĉ(W (S; z̄k)) 6= ∅.
Denition 7. Optimality priniple Ĉ(W (S; z̄1)) is strongly time-onsistent in game
G(z̄1), if
1). Ĉ(W (S; z̄k)) 6= ∅, k = 1, ℓ






βt ⊕ Ĉ(W (S; z̄k+1)) ⊂ Ĉ(W (S; z̄1)), k = 1, ℓ.
Proposition 5. Optimality priniple Ĉ(W (S; z̄1)) is strongly time-onsistene.
Example Consider an example with N = 3, k = 3, i.e. 3-person three-stage game
starting from state z1. In state z1 we have 6 matries, 3 matries of the rst type,
and 3 of seond type. In state z1 all bimatrix games take plae with matries of
the rst type. In state z1 every player i ∈ N hoose his strategy ui(z1). If all
uji (z1) = 1, i ∈ N, j ∈ N \ {i}, then players pass to the state z2, where they
play bimatrix games with same payo matries of rst type. If at least one of the
omponents uji (z1) = 2, i ∈ N, j ∈ N \ {i}, then in state z2 players play bimatrix
games with the seond type of matries. Similarly, the transition to the state z3: if
all uji (z2) = 1, i ∈ N, j ∈ N \ {i}, then players in state z3 use rst type of matries.
If at least one of the omponents uji (z2) = 2, i ∈ N, j ∈ N \ {i}, then in state z3
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Fig. 3. Network on the rst stage
players should to be in touh with all neighbours throughout the game. Strategies
of players:
u1(z1) = (0, 2, 1), u2(z1) = (1, 0, 2), u3(z1) = (2, 2, 0),
u1(z2) = (0, 2, 1), u2(z2) = (2, 0, 1), u3(z2) = (2, 1, 0),
u1(z3) = (0, 2, 1), u2(z3) = (2, 0, 1), u3(z3) = (2, 1, 0).
Calulate the values ωij(z):
ω112(z1) = 1, ω
2
12(z1) = 1, ω
1
13(z1) = 1, ω
3
13(z1) = 0,
ω223(z1) = 2, ω
3
23(z1) = 1,
ω112(z2) = 10, ω
2
12(z2) = 6, ω
1
13(z2) = 9, ω
3
13(z2) = 10,
ω223(z2) = 9, ω
3
23(z2) = 6.
Values ωiij(z3) will oinide with ω
i
ij(z2) or with ω
i
ij(z1), sine there are only
two types of matries in the game.
Calulate the values of harateristi funtions v(S; z), w(S; zk):
S {1} {2} {3} {12} {13} {23} {123}
v(S; z̄1) 2 3 1 21 20 27 62
v(S; z̄2) 19 15 16 40 40 36 66
v(S; z̄3) 19 15 16 40 40 36 66
w(S; z̄1) 19 15 16 40 40 36 58
w(S; z̄2) 19 15 16 40 40 36 66
w(S; z̄3) 19 15 16 40 40 36 66
Game starting from state z1, where players hoose their strategies and pass to
the new state, whih depends from this hoie. In every state players have only two
alternatives: after hoosing strategies, pass to the game with rst type of payo
matries, or pass to the seond type of payo matries.
Numbers 1 and 2 above the arrows on Fig. 4 indiate what type of matries the
players will play in the next state. Calulate the values of funtion L in nodes zk:
L(z11) = 58 L(z
1
2) = 58 L(z
1
3) = 62 L(z
2
2) = 66 L(z
2
3) = 66
L(z33) = 62 L(z
4
3) = 66
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Fig. 4. Tree of all possible states of game.






3) = (z̄1, z̄2, z̄3). Calulate the
values of harateristi funtion in multistage game G(z1):
S {1} {2} {3} {12} {13} {23} {123}
V (S; z̄3) 19 15 16 40 40 36 66
V (S; z̄2) 38 30 32 80 80 72 132
V (S; z̄1) 40 33 33 101 100 99 190
W (S; z̄3) 19 15 16 40 40 36 66
W (S; z̄2) 38 30 32 80 80 72 132
W (S; z̄1) 57 45 48 120 120 108 190
Condition w(S, zk) < minz̄k L(zk), S 6= N holds:
max
S
w(S, zk) = 40 < min
z̄k
L(zk) = 58.







x1 + x2 ≥ 120,
x1 + x3 ≥ 120,
x2 + x3 ≥ 108,
x1 + x2 + x3 = 190.
(58)







ξ1 + ξ2 ≥ 80,
ξ1 + ξ3 ≥ 80,
ξ2 + ξ3 ≥ 72,
ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3 = 132.
(59)
Take as βk in IDP β = (β1, β2, β3) an imputation α ∈ Ĉ(w(S; z̄1)), (βk = α, k =
1, 2, 3).











α2 + α3 ≥ 36,
α1 + α2 + α3 = 58.
(60)







x̂1 + x̂2 ≥ 120,
x̂1 + x̂3 ≥ 120,
x̂2 + x̂3 ≥ 108,
x̂1 + x̂2 + x̂3 = 190.
(61)
It follows from last inequality, that x̂ ∈ Ĉ(W (S; z̄1)), whih proves strongly time-
onsisteny of Ĉ(W (S; z̄1)).
4. Nonzero-Sum Games with Pairwise Interations
In this part we will onsider general nonzero-sum game with pairwise intera-
tions. Previously we onsidered only bimatrix games.
Consider (Bulgakova and Petrosyan, 2019b) multistage nonzero-sum game with
nite number of stages. As before, on the rst stage players hose their behaviors
and formed a network. On next stages simultaneous non-zero sum games will be
played. Payos depend on ontrols, hosen on eah urrent stage. Players an hange
the network on every stage exept the rst, deleting some onnetions.
4.1. The Model
In every state zk ∈ Z, k > 0 players an hange the network by deleting some
onnetions, so we denote the network as g(zk), to show the network dependeny
on state.
Denote as Ni(g(z0)) neighbours of player i in network g(z0), i. e. Ni(g(z0)) =
{j ∈ N \ {i} : ij ∈ g(z0)}.
When network g(z0) is formed, the game passed to the state z1(g(z0)), whih is
determined by network g(z0). In state z1(g(z0)) players an delete some onnetions,
whih were formed early. So, network g(z0) in general will hange to g(z1) and
we may have new set of neighbours Ni(g(z1)). On network g(z1) players play the
simultaneous nonzero-sum game Γ (z1).
On the seond stage z1 player i, i = 1, n, hose ontrol yi(z1) = (bi(z1), xi(z1))
from set of ontrols Yi, whih, unlike the rst stage z0, ontains an additional om-
ponent xi(z1)  behavior in game Γ (z1). Where bi(z1) is vetor with omponents
0 or 1, dened in following way:
bij(z1) =
{
1, save onnetion ij,
0, delete onnetion ij,
(62)
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i. e. player on seond stage an delete some onnetions but has no abilities to reate
new onnetions. Component xi(z1) of ontrol yi(z1) = (bi(z1), xi(z1)) is behavior
of player i in game Γ (z1) hosen from set Xi(z1), in state z1.
Let y(z1) = (y1(z1), . . . , yn(z1)) be a strategy prole in game Γ (z1). Player's





where g(z1) is network, orresponding to strategy prole y(z1). Funtions
hi(xi(z1), xj(z1)) ≥ 0 are given for all i ∈ N and all pairs ij, i. e. all edges of
network g(z1) and all possible states z ∈ Z.
Players i ∈ N hose ontrols (y1(zk−1), . . . , yn(zk−1)) in state zk−1 ∈ Z in game
Γ (zk−1). Result of this hoie is transition to state zk, where Γ (zk) is played, with
payos hi(xj(zk), xi(zk)), depended on ontrols, hosen in state zk. We may dened
a transition T : Z× Y1 × Y2 × . . .× Yn → Z by formula
zk = T (zk−1; y1(zk−1), y2(zk−1), . . . , yn(zk−1)), k = 1, ℓ. (63)
The, funtion T uniquely denes state zk, whih follows after state zk−1, if
players hose ontrols y1(zk−1), y2(zk−1), . . . , yn(zk−1).
Consider multistage game G(z), whih develops in following way. Game G(z0)
starts in state z0. In state z0 network g(z0) is formed, after that players pass to state
z1. In state zk−1 players hose ontrols y1(zk−1), y2(zk−1), . . . , yn(zk−1), play game
Γ (zk−1) and pass to state zk = T (zk−1; y1(zk−1), y2(zk−1), . . . , yn(zk−1)). Game
ends on stage ℓ + 1 in state zℓ. Thus, after hoosing ontrols on every state of the
game the path z0, z1, . . . , zk, . . . , zℓ is realized.
State zk is alled aeptable, if there exists the sequene of ontrols and the
sequene of states z0, z1, . . . zk, k ≤ ℓ generated by it, dened by formula (63), suh
that zk = z.
Strategy in multistage game: yi(·), i ∈ N , is a rule, whih for every aeptable
state z assoiates omponents bi(z), xi(z) of ontrol in this state, i. e. the hoie of
onnetions for deleting, and hoie of behavior xi(z) in game Γ (z). It the follows
from above that any strategy prole y(·) = {y1(·), . . . , yn(·)} denes only one path








The set of all paths in game G(z) is nite. So, the set of all aeptable states
also is nite. Denote it as Z ⊂ Z.
Suppose, that players hoose ontrols ȳi(z), i ∈ N , that maximize their joint











Hi(y1(zk), . . . , yn(zk)). (64)
Strategy prole ȳ = (ȳ1, . . . , ȳn) is alled ooperative behavior in gameG(z), and
path, orresponding to ontrols ȳi(z), i ∈ N , (z̄0, z̄1, . . . , z̄ℓ) is alled ooperative
path (z0 = z̄0).
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Consider one-stage game Γ (z) in any state z ∈ Z in ooperative form and
dened harateristi funtion v(S; z), S ⊂ N , for every subset (oalition) S ⊂ N
in following way:
v(∅; z) = 0,
v({i}; z) = 0,
v({ij}; z) =
{















where x̄i(z), x̄j(z) alulated orresponding to (64).
We see that to alulate values of harateristi funtion, we should nd ooper-
ative behavior in game G(z0) and after that alulate v(S; zk), k = 1, ℓ as payos,
under assumption, that players hoose ooperative behavior as omponents of their
ontrols.
Dend the harateristi funtion V (S; zk) in multistage game G(zk), whih
starts in state zk, as sum of oalition S payos along the ooperative path
(ȳ(z0), ȳ(z1), . . . , ȳ(zl)) in ℓ− k + 1 stages, starting from k:











V (S; zℓ) = v(S; zℓ).
The following theorem holds:
Theorem 6. Charateristi funtion v(S; z) in game Γ (z) is supermodular.
4.2. The Shapley Value
Consider as a solution of game Γ (z) the Shapley value ϕ[v] = (ϕ1[v], . . . , ϕn[v]),
(15).
Calulate the dierene [v(S; z)− v(S \ {i}; z)]:
[v(S; z)− v(S \ {i}); z] =
∑
j∈Ni(g(z))∩S
(hi(x̄i(z), x̄j(z)) + hj(x̄j(z), x̄i(z))).








(hi(x̄i(z), x̄j(z)) + hj(x̄j(z), x̄i(z))), i ∈ N.
(66)
This formula does not require the alulating the values of harateristi funtion
for all S ⊂ N . To alulate the omponents of the Shapley value we need to know
only the struture of network g(z).
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4.3. IDP-Core and Strongly Time-Consisteny
As previously MV is set of all imputations G(z0).
Introdue IDP βi = (β
0
i , . . . , β
ℓ




βri , i ∈ N. (67)
Consider as optimality priniple subset of the ore for game G(z̄k)  IDP-ore
(Wolf, Zakharov and Petrosian, 2017; Petrosian, Gromova and Pogozhev, 2018)
C(V (S; z̄k)), i. e. set of IDP, whih satised following onditions:
∑
i∈S



















where βi = (β
i
1, . . . , β
i










hi(x̄i(zk), x̄j(zk)), S ⊂ N, (70)
N∑
i=1






Suppose, that all C(V (S; z̄k)) 6= ∅.
Denition 8. Optimality priniple C(V (S; z̄0)) 6= ∅ is strongly time-onsistent in
game G(z̄0), if
1) C(V (S; z̄k)) 6= ∅, k = 0, ℓ;
2) For every imputation x ∈ C(V (S; z̄0)) there exists suh IDP β = (β0, . . . , βℓ),
ξ =
∑ℓ
r=0 βj , suh that
k∑
r=0
βr ⊕ C(V (S; z̄k+1)) ⊂ C(V (S; z̄0)), k = 0, ℓ.
Here symbol ⊕ means, that if a ∈ Rn, B ⊂ Rn, then a⊕B = {a+ b : b ∈ B}.
Proposition 6. Optimality priniple C(V (S; z̄0)) is strongly time-onsistent.
4.4. Example
This example is similar to one from the previous setion. Consider the ase with
N = 3, ℓ = 3, i. e. game onsist four stages and starts in state z0. In this state sets
Mi of players, whom player i an oer a onnetion, are given.
M1 = {2, 3}, M2 = {1, 3}, M3 = {1, 2}.
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Restritions for number of onnetions for every player are also given.
a1 = 1, a2 = 1, a3 = 2.
In state z0 players hoose vetors bi(z0), formed the network g(z0) and pass to the
state z1. In every state zk, k ≥ 1 players hoose ontrols yi(zk) = (bi(zk), xi(zk)),
where bi(zk)  player's regulation onnetions vetor (with omponents 1 and 0),
and xi(zk) is equal to
x1(zk) = x1(z) ∈ X1 = {x11(z), x21(z)},
x2(zk) = x2(z) ∈ X2 = {x12(z), x22(z)}, x3(zk) = x3(z) ∈ X3{x13(z), x23(z)}
i. e. every player i has the same set of ontrol omponents Xi in every state zk.
For all aeptable states zk, k ≥ 1, and all possible strategies payos
hi(x̄i(zr), x̄j(zr)) are given in following way: hi(x̄i(zr), x̄j(zr)) and h
′
i(x̄i(zr), x̄j(zr)).
In state z1 game takes plae with payos h(x̄i(z1), x̄j(z1)). In state z1 ev-
ery player i ∈ N hoose his omponent of ontrol xi(z1), and if all xi(z1) =
x1i (z1), i ∈ N , then players pass to the state z2, in game, where payos are sim-
ilar hi(x̄i(z2), x̄j(z2)). If at least one of omponents xi(z1) = x
2
i (z1), i ∈ N , then
in state z2 players play game with payos h
′
i(x̄i(z2), x̄j(z2)). Similarly, the pass
to the state z3: if all xi(z1) = x
1
i (z1), i ∈ N , then in state z3 players use payos
hi(x̄i(z3), x̄j(z3)), if at least one of the omponents xi(z1) = x
2
i (z1), i ∈ N , then



















































































































































































































































In state z0 players hoose their behavior to maximize the joint payo of all
players:
b1(z0) = (0, 0, 1), b2(z0) = (0, 0, 1), b3(z0) = (1, 1, 0).
As result we have the following network:









Fig. 5. Network on the rst stage
Players have an ability to delete onnetions on all stages, exept the rst, but
to maximize the joint payo it is beneial for players to be in touh with all
neighbors throughout the game, i. e. bi(z0) = bi(z1) = bi(z2) = bi(z3), for all i ∈ N .
Components of ontrols ȳi(z) for players:
x̄1(z1) = x
2
1, x̄2(z1) = x
1





1, x̄2(z2) = x
2





1, x̄2(z3) = x
2
2, x̄3(z3) = x
1
3.
Calulate the values of harateristi funtion v(S; z) in all states on ooperative
path, exept z0, beause on the rst stage players only form the network and do
not get any payos.
S {1} {2} {3} {12} {13} {23} {123}
v(S; z̄1) 0 0 0 6 6 10 16
v(S; z̄2) 0 0 0 14 12 20 32
v(S; z̄3) 0 0 0 14 12 20 32
In state z1 players hoose their ontrols and pass to the next state, whih de-
pends from this hoie. In every state every player has only two alternatives: hoose
ontrols and pass in state where play game Γ (zk) with payos hi(x̄i(zk), x̄j(zk)), or
pass to the state with game, where payos are h′i(x̄i(zk), x̄j(zk)).
Fig. 6. Tree of all possible states in game
Numbers 1 and 2 above arrows (g. 6) indiate whih payos will be used by
players in the next state: 1 means hi(x̄i(zk), x̄j(zk)), 2  h
′
i(x̄i(zk), x̄j(zk)).






3) = (z̄0, z̄1, z̄2, z̄3). Calulate
the values of harateristi funtion in multistage game G(z0):
S {1} {2} {3} {12} {13} {23} {123}
V (S; z̄3) 0 0 0 14 12 20 32
V (S; z̄2) 0 0 0 28 24 40 64
V (S; z̄1) 0 0 0 34 30 50 80
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x1 + x2 ≥ 34,
x1 + x3 ≥ 30,
x2 + x3 ≥ 50,
x1 + x2 + x3 = 80.
(72)
As βk in IDP β = (β0, β1, β2, β3) we will take imputations α
k ∈ C(v(S; z̄k)),




















































q̂1 + q̂2 ≥ 34,
q̂1 + q̂3 ≥ 30,
q̂2 + q̂3 ≥ 50,
q̂1 + q̂2 + q̂3 = 80.
(75)
From last inequality follows, that q̂ ∈ C(V (S; z̄0)). In other words, imputation
from set C(V (S; z̄0)), an be deomposed on the sum of imputations from the
sets C(v(S; z̄k)), k = 1, 2, 3,. This proves strongly time onsisteny of optimality
priniple C(V (S; z̄0)).
5. Conlusion
The paper disusses the results in the eld of ooperative network games with
pairwise interation. Two-stage and multistage games and various approahes to
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the determination of the harateristi funtion in eah of them are onsidered. The
ooperative solutions, suh as the Shapley value and the ore, are examined and the
properties of their time-onsisteny as well as strongly time-onsisteny are investi-
gated and the onditions for it are found. Speial types of networks are onsidered,
suh as a omplete network, a star-network, and the possibilities for solutions that
give suh geometri strutures are investigated. All results are illustrated by exam-
ples.
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